

Countries and Concepts

POLITICS, GEOGRAPHY, CULTURE

THIRTEENTH EDITION



MICHAEL G. ROSKIN

Countries and Concepts

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Countries and Concepts

Politics, Geography, Culture

Thirteenth Edition

Michael G. Roskin
Lycoming College

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Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Amsterdam
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Publisher: Charlyce Jones-Owen
Project Manager: Rob DeGeorge
Editorial Assistant: Maureen Diana
Operations Specialist: Mary Ann Gloriande
Digital Studio Project Manager: Tina Gagliostro
Permissions Project Manager: Peggy Davis
Project Coordination, Text Design, and Electronic Page Makeup: Integra Software Services Pvt., Ltd
Cover Design: Lumina Datamatics, Inc.
Cover Image: Michael G. Roskin
Printer and Binder: RR Donnelley/Crawfordsville
Cover Printer: Phoenix Color Corp.

Acknowledgements of third party content appear on page xix, which constitutes an extension of this copyright page

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Roskin, Michael G.,
Countries and concepts : politics, geography, culture / Michael G. Roskin, Lycoming College. — Thirteenth edition.
pages cm.
ISBN 978-0-13-396308-3 — ISBN 0-13-396308-X 1. Comparative government. I. Title.
JF51.R54 2015
320.3—dc23

2014017552

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Student Edition:
ISBN 10: 0-13-396308-X
ISBN 13: 978-0-13-396308-3

A La Carte Edition:
ISBN 10: 0-13-395145-6
ISBN 13: 978-0-13-395145-5

Instructor's Review Copy:
ISBN 10: 0-13-395147-2
ISBN 13: 978-0-13-395147-9

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Brief Contents

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Detailed Contents

Preface

Some students see little point in comparative politics. It may be interesting, they say, but it has no applied use. Not true; it can be quite practical. One of the great questions of the early twenty-first century is whether China can turn democratic. Comparative politics can contribute strongly to this question and provide both practical and theoretical knowledge. Without any pat answers, we can show how other countries founded and maintain democracies. Comparativists cannot predict what will happen in China, but they can warn with both positive and negative examples.

Brazil's generals, for example, gradually "decompressed" their authoritarian system into stable democracy, demonstrating that such transitions are possible. Louis XVI, on the other hand, waited until too late to allow a National Assembly. The result was the French Revolution and instability ever since. Beijing has already assimilated the lesson of the Soviet collapse, namely, the Soviet tendency to petrify until the system cracked. China's leadership has been far more flexible, practicing an "adaptive authoritarianism" that gives way in the face of mass unrest.

The thirteenth edition of *Countries and Concepts* introduces such examples in new boxes, one per chapter, on what that country could teach China. At this point, of course, Beijing is in no mood to listen to outside advice, which it denounces as meddling in its internal affairs and aimed at overthrowing the regime. Some day, however, after having waited until too late, the Zhongnanhai may feel a sudden need for comparative suggestions on how to democratize. Until then, the "lessons" are just intellectual exercises to demonstrate the utility of comparative politics.

Countries and Concepts does not attempt to create young scholars out of college students. Rather, it sees comparative politics as an important but usually neglected grounding in citizenship that we should be making available to our young people. I agree with the late Morris Janowitz (in his 1983 *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness*) that civic education has declined in the United States and that this poses dangers for democracy. Our students are often uninformed about the historical, political, economic, geographical, and moral aspects of democracy, and to expose them to professional-level abstractions in political science ignores their civic education and offers material that is largely meaningless to them. An undergraduate is not a miniature graduate student.

Accordingly, *Countries and Concepts* includes a good deal of fundamental vocabulary and concepts, buttressed by many examples. It is dedicated to Kant's injunction that concepts must never be separated from percepts. It is readable. Many students neglect assigned readings; with *Countries and Concepts,* they cannot make the excuse that the reading is long or boring.

Some reviewers note that *Countries and Concepts* contains values and criticisms. This is part of my purpose. The two go together; if you have no values, then you have no basis from which to criticize. Value-free instruction is probably impossible. If successful, it would produce value-free students, and that, I think, should not be the aim of the educational enterprise. If one knows something with the head but not with the heart, then one really does not know it at all.

Is *Countries and Concepts* too critical? It treats politics as a series of ongoing quarrels for which no very good solutions can be found. It casts a skeptical eye on all political systems and all solutions proposed for political problems. As such, the book is not out to "get" any one country. All political

systems are flawed; none approaches perfection. Let us simply say so. *Countries and Concepts* rejects absurd theories of smoothly functioning systems or rational calculators that never break down or make mistakes. Put it this way: If we are critical of the workings of our own country's politics—and many, perhaps most, of us are—why should we abandon that critical spirit in looking at other lands?

New to This Edition

Instructor input and the rapid march of events prompted some changes in the thirteenth edition of *Countries and Concepts*.

Country updates include:

- *France*: Socialist François Hollande won the presidency in 2012 but became deeply unpopular.
- *Germany*: Angela Merkel was reelected chancellor in 2013, but without great enthusiasm.
- *Japan*: The Liberal Democrats returned to power under a nationalistic prime minister.
- *Russia*: Putin's third presidential term brought a deliberate crisis with Ukraine.
- *China*: A fifth generation of leaders took power in Beijing and instituted economic but not political reforms.
- *India*: The BJP and Modi, pledging economic growth, ousted the Congress Party in 2014.
- *Mexico*: PRI returned to the presidency but as a moderate and modern party.
- *Brazil*: Mass anger disrupted Brazil as its economy stalled.
- *Nigeria*: Violence among Northern Islamists shook an increasingly unstable Nigeria.
- *Iran*: A moderate cleric won the presidency in 2013 but liberalized little.

The current edition retains most of the previous changes. A general and abstract introductory chapter surveys the theory behind comparative politics, including the definition of democracy, the rise of states, and modernization theory. We retain Brazil, which appeared in earlier editions, as its growth from a shaky to a firm democracy shows that a country can modernize out of praetorianism. A "Why This Country Matters" section introduces every chapter. We also keep the shorter, one-chapter versions of our major systems—Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China—to keep them closer in length to the other systems—Japan, India, Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, and Iran—and easier to assign in the course of one semester.

Features

The thirteenth edition continues the loose theoretical approach of previous editions with the observation that politics, on the surface at least, is composed of a number of conflicts or quarrels. These quarrels, if observed over time, form patterns of some durability beyond the specific issues involved. What I call "patterns of interaction" are the relationships among politically relevant groups and individuals, what they call, in Russian, *kto-kovo,* who does what to whom. There are two general types of such patterns: (1) between elites and masses and (2) among and within elites.

Before we can appreciate these patterns, however, we must study the political culture of a particular country, which leads us to its political institutions and, ultimately, to its political history. This produces a fivefold division in the study of each country. We could start with a country's contemporary political quarrels and work backward, but it is probably better to begin with the underlying factors as a foundation from which to understand their impact on modern social conflict. This book goes from history to institutions to political culture to patterns of interaction to quarrels. This arrangement need not supplant other approaches. Instructors have had no trouble utilizing this book in connection with their preferred theoretical insights.

Also, political geography gets some of the attention it deserves. Instructors agree that

ignorance of geography is widespread; the subject seems to have been dropped from most school curricula. *Countries and Concepts* tries to fill this gap by combining political with geographical material, and the two fields overlap.

The structure and purpose of *Countries and Concepts* continue as before. The book analyzes four European nations plus China at somewhat greater length and seven other nations a bit more briefly. I am willing to change this balance in subsequent editions, depending on instructor input. Should, for example, France and Germany shrink some more and India and Nigeria expand? The first part of the book (Chapters 2 through 5) deals with democracies, the second part (Chapters 6 and 7) with post-Communist Russia and China, and the third part (Chapters 8 through 12) with the developing areas.

Our greater coverage of the developing areas is called for by their economic growth and the shift of U.S. interest far beyond Europe. The emerging lands are simply too important, especially on the question of democracy. China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, and Iran are not "representative" systems—What developing-area countries are?—but are interesting in their six different relationships to democracy: (1) the suppression of democracy in a rapidly industrializing China, (2) a durable if imperfect democracy in India, (3) democracy stabilizing in Mexico after a long period of one-party rule, (4) the establishment of democracy in Brazil, (5) the difficult founding of a stable democracy in coup-prone Nigeria, and (6) democracy smothered by an Islamic revolution in Iran. These six systems provide a counterpoint to the more settled systems of Europe and Japan. Instructors can and do omit some or all of these systems—for lack of time or to focus more closely on other countries—without breaking the continuity of the text.

The order of studying these countries is not fixed. I find four groupings convenient, each followed by an exam, to facilitate comparisons between countries with similar problems: (1) Britain and France, (2) Germany and Japan, (3) Russia and China, and (4) India, Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, and Iran. The book may lend itself to other groupings. Some may want to compare China and India, the Asian giants on two very different developmental paths.

Also included are the chapter-opening learning objectives, which prime students for the main points, and the running marginal glossaries, which help students build their vocabularies as they read. The definitions here are those of a political scientist; in other contexts, one might find different definitions. Questions at the end of each chapter will help students review the concepts they've learned. The feature boxes still have poster-heads—Geography, Democracy, Personalities, Political Culture, Comparison, and, now, China Lessons—to give them greater focus and continuity.

Acknowledgments

I welcome your suggestions on any area of the book and its supplementary materials. Many have generously offered their comments, corrections, and criticism. Especially valuable were the comments of Julie Mazzei, Kent State University; Edward Schwerin, Florida Atlantic University; Yury Polsky, Westchester University; David Goldberg, College of DuPage; Timothy Schorn, College of South Dakota; Nina Barzachka, Mary Baldwin College; Philip Otterness, Warren Wilson College; Sam Hoff, Delaware State University; Elizabeth Nyman, University of Louisiana at Lafayette; Anne Marie Choup, University of Alabama, Huntsville; Gunther Hega, Western Michigan University; Jacqueline Gehring, Allegheny College; Danny Damron, Brigham Young University; Robert L. Youngblood, Arizona State University; Eleanor E. Zeff, Drake University; Christian Soe, California State University at Long Beach; Cheryl L. Brown, University of North Carolina at Charlotte; Karl W. Ryavec, University of Massachusetts at Amherst; Frank Myers, State University of New York at Stony

Brook; Ronald F. Bunn, University of Missouri at Columbia; Said A. Arjomand, State University of New York at Stony Brook; Larry Elowitz, Georgia College; Arend Lijphart, University of California at San Diego; Thomas P. Wolf, Indiana University, Southeast; Susan Matarese, University of Louisville; Hanns D. Jacobsen, Free University of Berlin (on Germany); Ko Shioya of *Bungei Shunju* (on Japan); Carol Nechemias, Penn State at Harrisburg; Marcia Weigle, Bowdoin College (on Russia); Lowell Dittmer, University of California at Berkeley; Richard Suttmeier, University of Oregon; Kenneth Lan and Morton Holbrook, United International College, Zhuhai, China; Bill K. P. Chou, University of Macau; Liu Lin, Jishi Li, and Chu Chengya, Shandong University; Dan O'Connell, Florida Atlantic University; Peter Muth (on China); Jim Coyle, Chapman University, and Lycoming colleague Mehrdad Madresehee (on Iran); John Peeler, Bucknell University; Stephen D. Morris, Middle Tennessee State University; and Niels de Terra (on Mexico); Robbins Burling, University of Michigan; Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University (on India); and Ed Dew, Fairfield University, for his suggestion to include geography. And to several professors in China—who must remain nameless—I say thanks and *Minzhu!* All errors, of course, are my own. Instructors may send professional comments and corrections to me at maxxumizer@gmail.com. I am grateful for suggestions for subsequent editions.

Michael G. Roskin

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Supplements

Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to qualified adopters of *Countries and Concepts* and their students that will make teaching and learning from this book even more effective and enjoyable. Several of the supplements for this book are available at the Instructor Resource Center (IRC), an online hub that allows instructors to quickly download book-specific supplements. Please visit the IRC welcome page at www.pearsonhighered.com/irc to register for access.

Instructor's Manual/Test Bank

This resource includes learning objectives, chapter outlines, chapter summaries, lecture starters, discussion questions, activities, and teaching suggestions, as well as original multiple-choice, true/false, short answer, and essay questions for each chapter. Available exclusively on the IRC.

Pearson MyTest

This flexible, online test-generating software includes all questions found in the test bank, allowing instructors to create their own personalized exams. Instructors can also edit any of the existing test questions and even add new questions. Other special features of this program include random generation of test questions, creation of alternate versions of the same test, scrambling of question sequence, and test preview before printing. Available exclusively on the IRC.

PowerPoint® Presentation

Organized around a lecture outline, these multimedia presentations also include photos, figures, and tables from each chapter. Available exclusively on the IRC.

Longman Atlas of World Issues (0-205-78020-2)

From population and political systems to energy use and women's rights, the *Longman Atlas of World Issues* features full-color thematic maps that examine the forces shaping the world. Featuring maps from the latest edition of *The Penguin State of the World Atlas*, this excerpt includes critical thinking exercises to promote a deeper understanding of how geography affects many global issues.

Goode's World Atlas (0-321-65200-2)

First published by Rand McNally in 1923, *Goode's World Atlas* has set the standard for college reference atlases. It features hundreds of physical, political, and thematic maps as well as graphs, tables, and a pronouncing index.

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Chapter 1

The Uses of Comparative Politics

Athens fell into paralysis in the fifth century BC and never recovered. Could it happen to current political systems?

Learning Objectives

1.1 Explain how comparative politics looks at the paralysis problem.
1.2 Contrast the terms *nation* and *state*.
1.3 Illustrate the impact a country's past has on its present politics.
1.4 List the main institutional structures most modern countries have.
1.5 Identify the most common social cleavages and explain how they influence political culture.
1.6 Describe how generalizations can lead to theory. Give examples.
1.7 Evaluate the importance of economics as a political quarrel.

The Paralysis Problem

1.1 Explain how comparative politics looks at the paralysis problem.

Much of the world faces what might be termed a "paralysis problem": governments stuck in situations they know are bad but blocked by opposing domestic forces from doing much about them. Related to the "double-bind" or "Catch-22" problem in which people know they must do something but are not allowed to, the paralysis problem afflicts most of the 11 countries in this book. Only Germany is in relatively good shape because of painful reforms carried out years earlier, but Germany too is paralyzed between bailing out feckless economies to the south or watching the eurozone—and perhaps the entire European Union—collapse. The U.S. Congress is so paralyzed, it can barely pass a budget.

Simultaneously, the democracies of the United States, European Union, and Japan are paralyzed over economic stagnation that potentially could damage their political systems. Torn between opposing interest groups and advice, no leaders dare upset large portions of their public with bold reforms. Our developing countries, although continuing to grow, face monumental corruption problems that undermine regime legitimacy. They keep promising to clean up but cannot fire large numbers of the corrupt officials they depend on to run the system. Eventually, some countries could reach a "tipping point" in which either disgruntled masses rise up or the military takes over.

comparative politics
Subfield of political science focused on interactions *within* other countries.

austerity
Government cutting expenditures to balance budget; economic belt-tightening.

authoritarian
Nondemocratic or dictatorial politics.

democracy
Political system of mass participation, competitive elections, and human and civil rights.

Here is where **comparative politics** is useful. It cannot predict, but it can warn. By comparing several countries it can discern patterns that specialized studies of one country cannot. Which governments apply **austerity** policies in the face of massive unemployment? Do their electorates react by voting them out? Are business, labor, and other interest groups so entrenched that they block needed reforms? How then may a government override them? Do ideological passions divide the country? How can **authoritarian** systems transition to **democracy**? These are some of the questions comparative politics attempts to answer with data and analyses.

power
Ability of A to get B to do what A wants.

quarrels
As used here, important, long-term political issues.

Comparativists might look at revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria and note that none of the old regimes had much legitimacy; their people did not respect them. Second, most of their population was young, under 30, a "demographic bulge," many of them educated but unemployed or underemployed. Third, corruption, always a problem in these countries, got worse, probably related to economic growth. And fourth, the social media—Internet, cellphones, Twitter, and Facebook—spread worldwide just as these problems were boiling up. China seems have two of these four factors (the third and fourth). What, then, are China's chances for stability?

Next, a comparativist might attempt to predict how revolutions will end up. Revolutions show a strong tendency to become chaotic and fall under a dictator. Few end well. To head off unhappy endings, a political scientist might suggest that the current regime carry out a gradual, peaceful transition aimed at eventual democracy. Unfortunately, by their very nature, authoritarian regimes reject advice to give up their wealth and **power**. Then, too late, when some incident has triggered a crisis, the frightened regime promises reforms. But its opponents sense weakness and demand the regime's ouster. Comparative politics offers the concepts, vocabulary, and case studies that can be useful, especially in tumultuous times.

Quarrels Over Time

There is no single, set way to compare countries. This book takes politics as a series of enduring **quarrels** that define the country's divisions and conflicts. A religious split or civil war long ago, for example, may influence party voting for centuries. Knowing a country's "quarrels over time" launches our analyses of a given political system. This book does not sell any one particular theory or methodology but uses a loose framework of five basic questions,

Democracy

Is Democracy Inevitable?

The long-term trend clearly favors democracy. From a handful of democracies after World War II, now perhaps half of the world's 193 nations are fully or partially democratic (see Defining Democracy box below for the Freedom House rankings). The human thirst for respect and dignity eventually weakens dictatorships. But it is also clear that democracy does not come easily or automatically, as Russia, Iraq, and Afghanistan attest. Here are some questions comparative politics might ask about the recent wave of revolution and democracy:

1. Where, historically, did democracy first appear? Why there? Is it connected with Protestantism?
2. Does democracy require certain philosophical and/or religious roots?
3. The American Revolution led to democracy, so why does this rarely happen elsewhere?
4. Why is democracy so difficult? Why does it often lead to chaos and dictatorial takeover?
5. Does democracy require a large middle class or certain levels of per capita wealth or education?
6. Which struggles are the most dangerous for the survival of democracy—class, religious, ethnic, or territorial?

international relations (IR) Politics *among* countries.

followed up by many detailed questions. These five questions roughly follow the intellectual evolution of political science over a century: from history, to institutions, to political culture, to interactions, to policy.

1. *How has the past impacted current politics?* We pay little attention to the details of history—that's for historians—but ask, "What happened then that matters now?" How has the country's past set up its current problems? The rule of old monarchs and old regional conflicts may echo in present institutions, psychology, and quarrels.
2. *What are the main institutions?* Institutions are structures of power, sometimes spelled out in constitutions but often the slow buildup of usages evolved over time. Who really has power in this country? Is power divided or concentrated, democratic or dictatorial? How are the parliament and chief executive elected?

Comparison

Comparative Politics among Political Science Subfields

Comparative politics sees itself as the cornerstone of political inquiry (see box about Aristotle), but it is one subfield among several within political science. Comparative politics can and should inform the other subfields. Sometimes failure to do so weakens analyses.

International relations is often confused with comparative politics—because both deal with foreign events—but they are different. Comparative politics studies political interactions *within* countries, whereas international relations studies what happens *among* countries. **International relations (IR)** tends to look at countries like billiard balls colliding with each other on the world pool table; comparative politics looks inside each ball to see how it works. The two, of course, influence each other.

Policy makers who attempt to apply IR perspectives without analyzing what is going on *inside* the countries involved often err. Knowing little of Afghanistan's, Iraq's, and Libya's tribes, religions, ethnic hatreds, and tumultuous histories, Washington officials trained in IR plunged us into other countries' civil wars, conflicts that were difficult to end or withdraw from. Comparativists, on the other hand, need some IR to explain foreign influences on domestic politics.

U.S. politics, although focused on domestic institutions and processes, sometimes picks a comparative perspective in emphasizing either American exceptionalism or similarities with other countries. Comparisons among U.S. states or over time (such as the powers of the presidency in 1800, 1900, and 2000) can also use techniques of comparative politics.

Political theory, often focused on major thinkers, attempts to define the good polity. Aristotle understood that one of the best ways to do this is by comparing several systems.

Public administration, which studies how bureaucracies function, benefits greatly from a comparative perspective. Does administration depend more on institutions or political culture?

Constitutional law, focused entirely on the U.S. Constitution and legal system, can become myopic in supposing that words on paper alone determine the fate of the country. Some comparison could correct this.

Public policy studies the interaction of politics and economics in order to develop efficient programs. Comparative data on health care, energy policy, education, and much else can help eliminate wishful thinking and supposition in this crucial field.

3. *How does the political culture influence politics?* Much depends on the customs and psychology of the people, their political culture. Are they trusting or cynical? Does ideology play a major role—if so, which ideology—or are people mostly pragmatic? Is the country, or regions of it, religious or secular? Could democracy take root in this country?

demagogue
Manipulative politician who wins votes through impossible promises.

4. *What are the patterns of interaction?* Here we get to what is conventionally called "politics." Who does what to whom? How do parties win elections? Which are the most powerful interest groups, and how do they make their voices heard? Who tends to prevail? Are things stable or are reforms overdue?

Personalities

Aristotle

"You cannot be scientific if you are not comparing," UCLA's great James Coleman used to tell his students long ago. He was actually echoing the founder of political science, Aristotle, who recognized that comparison was the basis of this discipline, its cardinal method. Aristotle sent out his students to collect information on Greece's many city-states (*polis*), which he then compared in his *Politics*, the work that gave the study of governance its first empirical database. In contrast, Aristotle's predecessor, Plato, focused almost entirely on Athens and used reason with little data for his *Republic*. As Kant saw centuries ago, reason alone is highly fallible. Reasoning from a factual basis, on the other hand, can be powerful.

One of Aristotle's classifications of Greek city-states, a sixfold table, has endured for centuries and is still useful. Aristotle first counted the number of rulers: one, several, or many. Then he divided each into "rule in the interest of all" and "rule in the interest of self." The first Aristotle called the good, legitimate form of governance; the second he called the bad, corrupt form. Then he named them:

Number of Rulers	Legitimate Form *Rule in Interest of All*	Corrupt Form *Rule in Interest of Selves*
one	monarchy	tyranny
Several	aristocracy	oligarchy
many	polity	democracy

For Aristotle, the worst form of government was "democracy," which we would call mob rule. He had seen how **demagogues** swayed mobs to make themselves powerful and destroy ancient Athens. He had good things to say about aristocracy, rule of the best (Greek *aristos*), and the polity, a calm, moderate democracy. But any of the legitimate forms, warned Aristotle, can decay into its corrupt counterpart.

Aristotle also found that the best-governed city-states had large middle classes. A large lower class could be seduced by demagogues into plundering the property of the middle class. A too-powerful rich class, however, could ignore citizen needs and make themselves even richer and more powerful. Either way, the state soon comes to an end. But a large middle class, neither rich nor poor, seeks good, stable governance with limits on power. Notice how both these points help explain the difficulty of establishing democracy in several countries today.

5. *What do they quarrel about?* Here we get to ongoing issues, visible in the country's media or in talking with citizens. The chief issue is usually the **political economy**. Is the economy growing? Why or why not? What reforms are suggested? How did the government handle the 2008–2009 recession? Should income be redistributed from better- to worse-off citizens? Noneconomic issues sometimes loom: Do the country's regions seek more autonomy or even to break away? Should immigrants be excluded or assimilated? Should touchy parts of the nation's past be covered up or faced?

political economy
Mutual influence of politics and economy; what government should do in the economy.

Democracy

Defining Democracy

Democracy is not a simple thing or one that automatically grows after *authoritarian* or *totalitarian* regimes have fallen. We were naive about stable democracy soon coming to Russia and Iraq. Democracy is a complex balancing act, requiring a political culture with the right philosophical, moral, economic, and legal underpinnings. Most definitions of democracy include the following:

Accountability. Elected officials must face a real possibility of losing re-election. This induces them to adopt Friedrich's *rule of anticipated reactions*.

Equality. One person, one vote. No citizens can be excluded. All may run for office.

Competition. Several candidates and parties compete in free and fair elections. A one-party system cannot be democratic.

Alternation. Occasional turnovers in power must replace the "in" party with the "out" party.

Representation. "The room will not hold all," so a few fairly represent the many. The electoral system does this, either by single-member districts (as in the United States and Britain) or proportional representation (as in Germany and Sweden).

Free media. Only democracies permit the press—now including the new social media—to criticize the government. This is the quickest check for democracy.

Harvard's Samuel Huntington suggested a "two-turnover test" for stable democracy. Two alternations of government—elections where one party replaces another—indicate a firmly rooted democracy. Since the Polish Communist regime fell in 1989, Poland has had several electoral turnovers from left to right and back again, indicating a well-rooted democracy. Russia has never had a turnover and is not soon likely to. No turnovers, no democracy.

Freedom House (FH) in Washington uses a seven-point scale to annually rank countries on how much they accord citizens political rights and civil liberties. FH calls 1 to 2.5 "free," 3 to 5 "partly free," and 5.5 to 7 "not free." Russia slid lower during the Putin years, but Indonesia advanced with a new democracy. Some of FH's 2014 findings are shown in the table below.

United States	1.0	free
Canada	1.0	free
Britain	1.0	free
Japan	1.0	free
Brazil	2.0	free
India	2.5	free
Indonesia	2.5	free
Mexico	3.0	partly free
Turkey	3.5	partly free
Nigeria	4.0	partly free
Russia	5.5	not free
Iran	6.0	not free
China	6.5	not free
Cuba	6.5	not free
North Korea	7	not free

Nations and States

1.2 Contrast the terms *nation* and *state*.

The Latin root of **nation** means *birth*, but few nations now define themselves by race (Japan and Korea still try); rather, *nation* now means people with a common sense of identity who often share the same language, culture, or religion. Nation building is not quick, easy, or natural. To build modern France, kings united several regions first by the sword and then by language and culture. The United States is a bizarre mix of peoples, processed over time into holding a set of common values. India and Nigeria, both mixes of languages and religions, are still engaged in nation building.

State means governmental institutions and laws. Obviously, these are not states in the sense of the 50 U.S. states, which lack **sovereignty** because ultimately Washington's laws prevail. Historically, states preceded and often formed nations. Over the centuries, the French government, by decreeing use of a certain dialect and spelling and enforcing nationwide educational standards, molded a French consciousness. The French state invented the French nation. All nations are, to a certain degree, **constructed**, somewhat artificial.

We might settle on the term *country*, which originally meant a rural area where people shared the same dialect and traditions but broadened in meaning until it became synonymous with nation or state. Some used *nation-state* to combine the psychological and structural elements, but the term did not catch on. Nation-states were often defined as having territory, population, independence, government, and other attributes, but none of them are clear-cut.

Territory would seem to be a basic requirement, but what about those who have a strong sense of peoplehood but lack real estate? For example, the Jews turned their sense of nationhood into Israel, and the Palestinians now define themselves as a nation that is ready for statehood. And what happens when territorial claims overlap? History is a poor guide, as typically many tribes and invaders have washed over the land over the centuries. France's Alsatians, on the west bank of the Rhine River, speak German and have Germanic family names. But they also speak French and think of themselves as French. Should Alsace belong to France or Germany? Wars are fought over such questions.

Population is obviously essential. But many countries have populations divided by language or **ethnicity**. Sometimes the groups are angry and wish to break away. Like the ex-Soviet Union, ex-Yugoslavia was composed of several quarrelsome nationalities whose departure destroyed the country. All countries, to be sure, are more or less artificial, but over time, some, such as France, have psychologically inculcated a sense of common nationhood that overrides earlier regional or ethnic loyalties. Germany has done this more recently, and India and China are still working on it. In Nigeria, the process has barely begun.

Independence means that the state governs itself as a sovereign entity. Colonies, such as India under the British, become nation-states when the imperial power departs, as the British did in 1947. Diplomatic recognition by other countries, especially by the major powers, confirms a country's independence and helps its economy. China got a boost when

nation
Cultural element of country; people psychologically bound to one another.

state
Institutional or governmental element of country.

sovereignty
Last word in law in a given territory; being boss on your own turf.

constructed
Deliberately created but widely accepted as natural.

ethnicity
Cultural characteristics differentiating one group from another.

failed state
Collapse of sovereignty; essentially, no national governing power.

secularization
Diminishment of role of religion in government and society.

the United States recognized it in 1972. Some countries, however, are more sovereign and independent than others. East European lands during the Cold War were Soviet satellites; Moscow controlled their major decisions. Are Central American "banana republics," under U.S. influence, truly sovereign and independent? Sovereign independence may be a convenient legal fiction.

Government is the crux of being a state. No government means anarchy, with the high probability that the country will fall apart or be conquered. Some call countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia **failed states**. Sometimes government can precede states. The Continental Congress preceded and founded the United States. A government can be in exile, as was de Gaulle's Free French government during World War II. The mere existence of a government does not automatically mean that it effectively governs the whole country. In many of the developing lands, the government's writ falls off as one travels farther from the capital. In several Mexican states, drug lords fight virtual civil war against the Mexican government and army.

Geography

What Made the Modern State

Europe began to stir in the eleventh century (late Middle Ages), but the Renaissance—starting in the fourteenth century—accelerated growth in art, philosophy, science, commerce, and population across Europe. The political system changed from feudalism to absolutism as monarchs increased and centralized their power over the nobles. By the middle of the fifteenth century, Europe was set for a revolution:

- **1453** The Turks used cannons to crack open the walls of Constantinople. European monarchs quickly acquired the new weapon to subdue nobles and consolidate their kingdoms.
- **1454** Gutenberg printed with moveable type. Printing increased the spread of information, speeding up all other processes and displacing Latin with local tongues. Printed materials helped the national capital govern outlying provinces.
- **1488** The Portuguese rounded Africa in order to reach Asia, soon followed by …
- **1492** The New World opened. Countries with access to the sea (Spain, Portugal, England, France, and the Netherlands) rushed to Asia, Africa, and the Americas for trade and colonies.
- **1494** Italian monk Luca Pacioli codified double-entry accounting, making it possible to control large businesses, which encouraged growth.
- **1517** Luther nailed his 95 theses to the church door and founded Protestantism. Soon, Protestant kings split from Rome and set up national churches, as in England and Sweden.
- **1545** This led to the wars of religion, first the Schmalkaldic War of 1545–1555 and then the devastating Thirty Years War of 1618–1648. These conflicts increased state power and curtailed the church's temporal power, leading to **secularization**.
- **1602** The world's first stock exchange opened in Amsterdam to trade shares in the new Dutch East India Company.
- **1618–1648** The Thirty Years War forced state administration to greatly improve. Warring monarchs, desperate for money, needed reliable tax bases and tax collectors. France's Richelieu and Sweden's Oxenstierna founded modern, rational administration to control and tax an entire country. The state got its own budget, separate from the royal household budget.

In sum, nation-states are not as clearcut as supposed; their realities are messy but interesting. This is one reason for using the admittedly vague term "country": It avoids **reification**, a constant temptation in the social sciences but one we must guard against.

reification
Taking theory as reality; from Latin *res*, thing.

causality
Proving that one thing causes another.

feudalism
Political system of power dispersed and balanced between king and nobles.

absolutism
Royal dictatorship that bypasses nobles.

The Modern State

Whatever we call the modern state—country, state, or nation-state—we must recognize that its current form is relatively recent. To be sure, states appear at the dawn of written history. (Ancient kingdoms, in fact, invented writing in order to tax and control.) But the modern state is only about half a millennium old and traces back to the replacement of old European feudal monarchies with what were called "new monarchies" and subsequently the "strong state." There are many factors in this shift; it is impossible to pinpoint which were the causes and which the consequences. **Causality** is always difficult to demonstrate in the social sciences, but the box "What Made the Modern State" discusses changes that ushered in the modern state. Notice how they happened about the same time and how each reinforced the others in a package of incredible change.

By the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, the feudal system had been displaced by the modern state. **Feudalism** had balanced power between monarch and nobles; it was loose and did not tolerate strong national government. It was not oriented to change or expansion. The new monarchies, on the other hand, were **absolutist**, concentrating all power in themselves, disdaining the old medieval constitution in which their powers balanced with nobles and using new economic, administrative, and military tools to increase their power. Royalist philosophers extolled the strong monarch and coined the term *sovereignty*. In consolidating their powers, monarchs had the concept of nation celebrated, giving rise to the notion of nationality, of belonging to a nation rather than merely being the subject of a hereditary ruler.

Nationalism

One can find a sort of nationalism far back in history—Israelites against Philistines, Romans against Carthaginians, Vietnamese against Chinese—but the French Revolution unleashed modern nationalism. As the armies of German princes closed in on the Revolution in 1792, the French people rallied *en masse* to repel the foe, believing they were defending both the Revolution and the *patrie* (fatherland), and the two concepts merged. France, the revolutionaries claimed, was destined to liberate and reform the rest of Europe. The concept of a nation embodying everything good was thus born, and it was spread throughout Europe by Napoleon's enthusiastic legions.

By its very nature, nationalism was contagious. The French soldiers turned into brutal and arrogant occupiers, and across Europe, local patriots rose up against them with the nationalism brought by the French. French nationalism thus triggered Spanish, German, and Russian nationalism. By the late nineteenth century, with German and Italian unification, most Europeans had either formed nationalistic states or desired to (for example, Poland). Thinkers